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European external trade policy in GATT-negotiations and 
member state preferences on the mandate for the Commission 
 
European trade policy in respect with third countries is coordinated by the European 
Commission (Commission). As such, it is the Commission that negotiates on behalf of 
the European Union during GATT/WTO-Rounds on trade liberalization. Although the 
Commission is the sole negotiator for the EU during external trade negotiations, it needs 
a mandate which has to be accepted in the Council of Ministers before it can take part in 
formal negotiations. Since member states are the central actors in the Council of 
Ministers, it is important to know their preferences on the Commission’s mandate and 
how these preferences are formed. This paper will focus on these national processes of 
preference formation and try to develop an explorative theoretical framework for a 
comprehensive explanation of preference formation. 
 In the first section of this paper, I will shortly explain the ‘puzzle’ giving rise to 
my research project and argue that in order to explain the process of national preference 
formation regarding subjects with important national and international dimensions (like 
for example trade policy), it is necessary to take into account the simultaneous 
importance of a state’s internal and external environment and the interactions between the 
two. In section two, I present a rough conceptual framework, which will be elaborated in 
the rest of the paper, and explicate a number of assumptions I use. The third, fourth and 
fifth sections will focus respectively on the external environment, the internal 
environment and the interactions between the two. Together these sections aim at 
exploring a theoretical framework for a comprehensive explanation of national preference 
formation. In the conclusion, I will recapitulate the most important points made in this 
paper. 
 
1. Theoretical and empirical importance of the research project 
 
The reason why it is of theoretical importance to develop a theoretical framework for a 
comprehensive explanation of state preferences, is that current approaches in political 
science that try to explain state preferences and behaviour tend to focus either on the 
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external (international) environment as the explanatory variable or – and that is what 
happens most of the time – exclusively on the domestic (national) environment to explain 
national preferences, missing the external-internal interaction. Without going into too 
much detail, it can be stated that Neo-Realism (e.g. Waltz 1979, Grieco 1990), Neo-
Institutionalism (Keohane and Nye 1989, Keohane 1984) and the second-image reversed 
literature (for an overview see Almond 1989) clearly focus on the external environment 
as the explanatory variable of state interests and behaviour: the structure of the 
international system and the role of international institutions are explanatory factors of 
great importance in this literature. In contrast, Foreign Policy Analysis (for an overview 
see Haney et al 1995) focuses on internal variables like public opinion, domestic 
institutions and interest group pressure as factors explaining a state’s foreign policy 
preferences and behaviour. Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1998) regards the 
state as representing the preferences of the most important societal groups and likewise 
provides a purely domestic explanation for national preferences. Finally, Social 
Constructivism can also be regarded to focus mainly on the domestic environment, since 
it assumes that shared national identities (which are by nature domestic) determine how 
actors view their interests and which preferences they regard as appropriate: national 
identities thus determine or imply preferences (Risse et al 1999, 157).  
There are some authors who, in line with the two-level games introduced by 
Putnam (Putnam 1988) explicitly focus on the interaction between the internal and 
external environment. However, these two-level games aim at explaining negotiations and 
its outcomes and not at explaining the process of national preference-formation taking 
place before the actual international negotiations. There is one approach that implicitly 
focuses on the expected relative impact of the internal and external environment on state 
preferences and behaviour; the domestic structure approach. This approach argues that a 
state’s internal structure (i.e. state-society relations, which can be rated on a continuum 
between state-dominated and society-dominated) influences the degree to which a 
government can be expected to take account of societal pressure or the degree to which 
the government is insulated from societal pressure and hence able to take account of 
external considerations (Katzenstein 1976, 1978; Risse-Kappen, 1991, 1995)1. The 
                                                 
1 In Section 4.2 I will provide indicators on the basis of which state-society relations my be defined. 
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expectation is that a government in a state with a society-centered structure will be easily 
influenced by societal actors, whereas a government in a state with a more state-
dominated structure is to a large degree insulated from societal pressure and can hence 
take account of considerations induced by external environment. However, this approach 
seems to lack explanatory power when confronted with certain empirical observations: 
and that is the ‘puzzle’ that initiated my research. Many authors on European governance 
observe that agricultural organizations both in France and in Germany are able to 
dominate the national positions in the Council of Ministers and often succeed in stalling 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or agricultural trade liberalization in 
the context of the GATT/WTO (Philips 1990, 140; Goverde 2000, 262; Keeler 1996; 128; 
Risse-Kappen 1995, 12; George and Bache 2000, 153, 167, 306). These empirical 
observations do not correspond with the theoretical expectations based on the domestic 
structure approach which would have predicted easy societal influence in a society-
dominated state like Germany, but not simultaneously both in Germany ánd in a state-
dominated state like France2. Clearly domestic structure, although an important indicator 
for the structural power relations between state and society, does not sufficiently explain 
the relative impact of the internal and external environment in the process of national 
preference formation. A study focusing on theoretical elaboration on the impact of the 
internal and external environment and the interactions between the two on the 
formulation of state-preferences is thus of both theoretical and empirical significance. 
 
It is necessary to take into account the simultaneous importance of the internal and the 
external environment and the interactions between the two in order to explain the process 
of national preference formation, because a state is by its nature Janus-faced: it has to 
look both to the internal or domestic environment and to the external or international 
environment. The external environment is characterized by an anarchic structure, because 
it lacks a central authority. In such a system of ‘self-help’, their relative power position is 
of the utmost importance to states, assuming they want to survive (cf Buzan et al 1993, 
                                                 
2 State-society relations are generally considered to be society-dominated in Germany and state-dominated 
in France ( e.g. Katzenstein 1978: 323-234; Risse-Kappen, 1991: 492, 504: Krasner, 1978: 58, Mastanduno 
et al 1989: 470: Skidmore 1993; 207: Zysman 1977: 852: Müller and Risse-Kappen 1993: 34: Van der 
Vleuten 2001: 87). 
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119-120)3. The internal environment is characterized by a hierarchical system in which 
the government is the central authority, but its position is dependent on the support of 
societal groups and coalitions (Mastanduno et al 1989, 463-464). Thus, if the state wants 
to survive in the international system and the government in the national system, it has 
simultaneously to take account of both the external and the internal environment. 
 The European external trade policy field is an issue area par excellence in which 
both external and internal dimensions are potentially of great importance. On the one 
hand, important domestic groups pressure the government to take actions – often 
protectionist – which are in their advantage, and try to stall trade liberalization when it is 
not in their interest. On the other hand, the national political and economic interest as a 
whole may be better served by trade liberalization, and both their membership of 
international organizations and pressure exerted by foreign states may induce the state to 
cooperate in trade liberalization. Explaining national preference formation on the 
negotiating mandate for the Commission in GATT/WTO negotiations therefore requires 
analysis of incentives arising from a state’s internal and external environment and on the 
consequences of interactions between the two environments. 
 
2. Conceptual framework and basic assumptions 
 
Figure 1 (page 5) lays down a rough conceptual framework indicating the main concepts 
(actors and structures) I am planning to use in exploring a theoretical framework for a 
comprehensive explanation of state preferences. 
The rest of this paper can be regarded as the first onset to fleshing out the bones of this 
framework: focusing on the different arrows separately and on the interrelations between 
different arrows.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
                                                                                           
                                                 
3 The consequences of the structure of the international system for state interests and behaviour is the 
subject of Section 3. 
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Assumptions: 
1. I take the state as the central actor in this study. This choice corresponds with my 
research aim, which is to gain an understanding of the process of national 
preference formation on foreign (trade) policy. Within the international system, 
states are the most important units, because they are the only units who are 
sovereign and who can legitimately use force (cf. Waltz 1979, 95). Within the 
national system, the government also has a privileged position. It is the only actor 
that can act on behalf of the state and present the national preference in 
international negotiations. This role of  sole representative of the state provides it 
with a central role when it comes to aggregating domestic preferences. I assume 
that in the process of national preference formation, the government considers its 
own preferences in relation to the preferences of societal actors and decides on the 
national preference that will be fought for in the international arena. 
2. I assume that actors are rational. This means that an actor decides as if he has 
ordered the expected outcomes of the behavioural options subjectively available 
to him on the basis of the utility he attaches to these outcomes. He is assumed to 
be utility maximizing and thus to prefer the option with the highest expected utility 
attached to it. 
Actors external to 
the state, e.g EU 
and VS               
Societal actors 
                      
Domestic 
Structure      
External 
structure 
                  
State           Govern- 
                      ment   
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3. I assume that the ultimate aim of the state and the government is to survive. 
Internationally, this means that a state wants to safeguard its position in the 
international system. This national interest of survival has three important 
dimensions: a security-political, economic and ideological dimension (Van der 
Vleuten 2001, 50). Sovereignty and territorial integrity (security-political), 
maximization of wealth (economic) and the defense of national identity and 
international prestige (ideological) can accordingly be seen as important state 
interests. In relation to preferences concerning trade policy, I assume that a state 
aims at maximizing wealth (economic interest) as long as this does not 
compromise its security-political interest. 
 
3. The external structure, interaction capacity and state interests 
 
3.1 The structure of the international system
The structure of the international system, or the external structure of the state ‘constrains 
and enables’ (Waltz 1979, 74), making particular behavioural options more attractive 
than others. In this sense, the external structure has consequences for state preference 
formation, because it explains the range of options available to a state and the costs and 
benefits attached to it. I will elaborate on this by treating two principles which Waltz4 
(1979) uses to define the international system: the principle by which the system is 
ordered and the distribution of capabilities across the units. In relation with the latter 
structural characteristic, I will also focus on the consequences of the particular position of 
a state within the system on its interests and preferences. 
 
The principle by which the system is ordered 
According to Waltz, there are two possible ordering principles: anarchy and hierarchy. 
The international system may be considered anarchic because it lacks a central authority 
                                                 
4 Waltz is an important proponent of a systems approach to international relations (e.g. Waltz 1979). He 
argues that there are three principles on the basis of which the international system can in principle be 
defined: the two mentioned above and ‘the specification of functions of differentiated units’ (Waltz 1979, 
82). Waltz claims the third principle is of no use, since all states are like units. However, the interaction 
capacity of the system – which I will focus on in section 3.2 - is closely related to functional differentiation, 
and is an important systemic concept in this study. 
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preventing others from breaking agreements or using violence. The consequence of 
anarchy is that the international system is a system of self-help. Since we assume that a 
state, above all, wants to survive, the structure of anarchy adds the conclusion that a state 
has to take care of its own survival. In the words of Waltz: “In an unorganized realm each 
unit’s incentive is to put itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no one 
else can be counted to do so. The international imperative is: take care of yourself!” 
(Waltz 1997, 107).  
States need capabilities in order to survive: the more capabilities a state possesses 
the better it can be expected to be able to survive. States will therefore try to optimize 
their economic, military and political capabilities, as these ‘permit a state to induce 
changes it desires in the behavior of others states or to resist what it views as undesirable 
changes in its own behavior sought by others’ (Grieco 1990, 39) and thereby enable states 
to safeguard their survival. This also means that states cannot afford not to worry about 
their power position (which is based on its capabilities): states are interested in 
safeguarding or increasing their power position, because it enhances their chances of 
survival in the anarchic international system.5 Waltz further adds that states would be 
wise to prevent themselves from becoming too dependent on other states, because that 
would also harm their ability to safeguard their position in the international system 
(Waltz 1979, 106). 
 National preference formation on trade liberalization can be expected to be 
influenced by the anarchic structure of the international system. It is directly related to the 
economic dimension of the national interest: maximizing wealth. I assume that, in their 
economic policy, states will try to maximize wealth and will only agree to less (possibly 
even economic losses), if that is necessary in the state’s political-military interest (see 
                                                 
5 Neo-Realists, like Grieco, argue that, as a consequence of anarchy, states are in search of relative gains in 
order to prevent an erosion of their economic, military and political capabilities relative to other states 
(Grieco 1990, 39). This implies that a state would only prefer to liberalize trade if it expects to gain more 
from liberalization than its trading partners or if gains are distributed equally. Grieco admits that relative 
gains concerns will not be equally great in all situations, but they are always present (Grieco 1988, 1993). 
Neo-Institutionalists (Keohane, 1993) claim that states are in search of absolute gains and that states are 
only sensitive to gaps in relative gains under a number of conditions and that sensitivity can even take on a 
negative value: implying that states under some conditions would be interested in other states gaining 
relatively more. I will treat relative gains concerns as a variable and not as a constant in this paper. In 
section 3.2 I will argue that relative gains concerns can be expected to vary, among other things, with the 
interaction capacity of the international system. 
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third assumption on page 6). Furthermore, trade liberalization may also affect the relative 
power position of states. Economic gains from trade liberalization are, in general, not 
distributed equally: international trade agreements decrease and increase states’ economic 
resources to a different degree and thereby affect the relative power positions of states 
(Gowa 1989, 1246; Grieco 1990). States can be expected to base their preference 
ordering of possible outcomes (of different trade policy options) on the power effects 
they expect to be related to the different outcomes. Finally, it should be kept in mind that 
liberalization - through the concomitant growth in trade streams and openness of the 
world trading system (particularly when trade liberalization is reciprocal) – tends to 
increase the interdependence between states, while states may wish to limit their degree 
of dependence on others.6 However, liberalization does not have equal dependence 
increasing effects on all states: this depends on the position of the state in the 
international system, which I will turn to in the next section. 
 
The distribution of capabilities 
 
States in the international system can be distinguished on the basis of their capabilities. 
These capabilities are attributes of the units (the states), but the distribution of capabilities 
across the states is a structural variable, indicating the power relations between states. 
The distribution of capabilities can also be defined as the polarity of the system, the 
degree to which power is concentrated within the states system, which increases as the 
capabilities in a system are distributed more unequally (Lieshout 1999a, 18); 1995, 104). 
On the basis of the distribution of capabilities, one can distinguish between multipolar, 
bipolar, and unipolar systems, all within an anarchic system. In a unipolar system one 
state, also called the hegemon, is dominant as a consequence of its abundance of 
capabilities compared to the other states in the system; in a bipolar system two states 
(superpowers) stand out; and in a multipolar system there are a number of great powers 
                                                 
6 State A is dependent on state B if state B’s policies have externalities for state A: producing costs and/or 
benefits. A distinction can be made between dependence-as-sensitivity and dependence-as-vulnerability. If 
states are affected by increased oil prices, states that import a relatively small part of their total oil 
consumption are less sensitive than states importing a large part of their total oil consumption. If state A has 
the alternative of shifting to domestic sources and state B has no such alternative, than state B is more 
vulnerable than state A (Keohane and Nye 1989, 12-13). 
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with approximately equal capabilities. Both the polarity of the international system and 
the position of a state within the system (if it is a hegemon, superpower, middle-sized 
power or small power) impact on the national preference formation of states.7
 The distinction between unipolar, bipolar and multipolar systems is important, for 
the degree of polarity can be related to the stability of the system. In a hierarchic system, 
like a national political system, it could be stated that the higher the polarity, the more 
stable the system. This connection (higher polarity Æ more stability) can only partly be 
made in the anarchic international system, because this is a system of self help in which 
states are confronted with a large number of risks to their security. Bipolar and unipolar 
systems are indeed more stable than multipolar systems8, because in systems with a high 
polarity the relations between states are clearer and changes in capabilities will only 
marginally affect the power-relations between states. The larger the difference between 
the more powerful state and the other states in the system, the less the powerful state will 
have to reckon with the expected behaviour of other states and ‘the more prudent the 
other states will judge it to be to consider that state’s expected behaviour’ (Lieshout 
1999a, 26). As a result, states are better able to predict the consequences of their 
behaviour and the behaviour of other states (Van der Vleuten 2001, 32). Distinguishing 
between unipolar and bipolar systems, I would argue that bipolar systems are more stable 
than unipolar systems. For superpowers in bipolar systems it is clear who is the enemy: 
the other superpower. These superpowers have to ‘balance’9 against each other. Middle-
sized powers can be expected to ‘bandwagon’ with one of the superpowers (probably the 
one which is ideologically closest), which provides them with security. Although 
hegemons in a unipolar system enjoy a great overweight in capabilities compared to other 
states, they are also confronted with a greater degree of uncertainty. Whereas bipolarity 
provides clarity on who the enemy is, in a unipolar system a number of (groups of) states 
                                                 
7 In the remainder of this paper the focus will be on bipolar and unipolar systems and on middle-sized 
powers, superpowers and hegemons, because the empirical part of my PhD-project will focus on preference 
formation in France and Germany (middle-sized powers) during the Uruguay Round (1986-1993: bipolarity 
up to 1990 and unipolarity after 1990). It is important to also treat the incentives for superpowers and 
hegemons, because the United States (superpower until 1990 and hegemon after 1990) is an important 
trading partner for the European member states and because it played an important role during the UR. 
8 For a thorough argumentation see Waltz, 1979, chapter 8. 
9 ‘Balancing’ and ‘bandwagoning’ are terms commonly referred to in theory on alliance formation. The 
former means that a (group of) state(s) balances against an other (group of) state(s) and the latter means that 
the smaller states in the system side with (one of) the great power(s). 
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may try to ‘balance’ against him and become his enemy. As a result unipolar systems 
provide less stability than bipolar systems.  
The overall stability of the system has consequences for preference formation. 
The larger the degree of stability of the international system, the less future gains will be 
discounted in national preference formation. This means that the value attached to long-
term future gains in a cost/benefit calculation of policy options is higher in more stable 
systems. With respect to economic liberalization this means that benefits of liberalization 
which are expected in the longer term (t = 1) - e.g. because gains are expected to grow 
through time as production processes are adjusted in such a way that economies of scale 
produces increasing gains – will be valued higher in cost/benefit calculations made ad t = 
0, as the degree of stability is higher. 
 
The specific position of a state in the international system is also important with respect 
to national preference formation (on trade policy), for different positions provide states 
with different incentives. Hegemons and superpowers can be expected to perform so 
called ‘management tasks’. Maintaining the system is considered to be the most 
important management task (Waltz 1979, 199), but management of common economic 
problems (e.g. leading to the provision and maintenance of trade regimes) may also be 
performed. Two arguments explain why hegemons and superpowers can be expected to 
perform these tasks. In the first place, a state’s interest in the international systems grows 
with its position in that system (Waltz 1979, 195). If a state is a larger ‘power’ it is in its 
interest to maintain and stabilize the system as it is, because his position in the system is 
advantageous. The argument that the larger a state, the larger its stake in the international 
system and the larger the chances that it will perform management tasks in order to 
maintain the system, may be underpinned by the assumption that order and maintenance 
in the system may be regarded a collective good.10 The larger a state’s interest in this 
collective good, the larger the chance that he will be willing to contribute to it 
disproportionally or provide it unilaterally. This is in line with Olson’s logic of collective 
                                                 
10 Collective goods are characterized by non-excludability and jointness of supply. The former indicates 
that contributors to the public good are unable to prevent noncontributors from consuming the good. This 
gives rise to the free rider problem. The latter indicates the existence of nonrivalry in consumption so that 
the consumption of the good by one actor does not inhibit the consumption of the good by another actor. 
(Conybeare 1984, 6; Olsen and Zeckhauser 1966, 26-27). 
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action in which he argues that the smaller the group11, the likelier it is that the collective 
good will come about (Olson 1965). The second argument is of an ideological nature. 
Maintenance of the existing order by the great powers can be translated in providing 
regimes (security, economic). By forming these regimes – which may benefit all states – 
in line with their ideological principles (e.g. market-economy focused), great powers can 
enhance their legitimacy (see for example Keohane 1984, 41-46). An additional 
economic argument, which can be but does not necessarily have to be related to the 
performance of management tasks by great powers, focuses specifically on trade policy 
and claims that states are able to benefit from liberalization more easily as they are more 
powerful (Gilpin 1983, 138-139). The larger a state, the larger its domestic market and 
the better the chances of it profiting from economies of scale. Moreover, the dependence 
consequences of liberalization generally tend to decrease with increasing state power. 
The export to production ratio is generally smaller in large states12 and larger in small 
states, making larger states relatively less dependent on international export markets as 
trade liberalization increases. Thus, not only can larger states be expected to be able to 
reap economic benefits from liberalization more easily, they also tend to suffer relatively 
less political costs in the form of increasing relative dependence. 
 Middle-sized powers are expected to free ride when it comes to contributing to 
collective goods (e.g. maintaining stability in the international system): they prefer to 
reap the benefits from collective goods without contributing to the good. This can be 
explained by the fact that their interest in the system is smaller than the interest of a 
hegemon or superpower. Olsen and Zeckhauser (1966, 30, 37-39) argue that great powers 
are unable to pass the costs of maintaining international regimes (which they regard as 
collective goods) to smaller states and that these smaller states are able to free ride. 
Because the great powers have such a great interest in the collective good, they will also 
provide it without the smaller states contributing. There are two comments I would like to 
make here: the first is a critique to the idea that regimes are genuine collective goods, and 
                                                 
11 Which in this case could be read as ‘the higher the polarity’ which implies that there is a smaller group of 
states at the top of the international system. 
12 Large states generally have a smaller proportion of their economy engaged in the international economic 
system (Krasner 1976, 320). 
Paper Gerry van der Kamp-Alons, Politicologenetmaal Antwerpen 2004                                                  12                     
secondly I will argue that a middle-sized state may regard free riding to be less in its 
interest in a unipolar system than in a bipolar system. 
 Not all regimes can be regarded as genuine collective goods. They can be 
regarded collective in the sense that they may benefit all states by providing order in the 
international system through the regulation of interactions in different issue areas. When 
it comes to a trade regime, it is a collective good as a multilateral system which provides 
trade liberalization.13 However, the benefits from trade liberalization are largely 
excludable: states can be excluded from trade negotiations for example. Furthermore, the 
benefits of trade (e.g. distribution of gains) are subject to rivalry: states can be expected 
to fight over the distribution of gains. Therefore I expect that great powers, when forming 
their preference on trade liberalization, will also pay attention to the expected distribution 
of gains and will not necessarily value unilateral trade liberalization higher than no 
liberalization at all. Assuming that great powers are generally well able to benefit from 
liberalization, they can still be expected to prefer it, but what I argue is that they will not 
accept unilateral trade liberalization unreciprocated by other states, if they are able to 
prevent this.  
 When middle-sized states are confronted with a superpower in a bipolar system 
they are likely to be able to free ride. In a bipolar system, both superpowers have their 
own sphere of influence and they have a great interest in maintaining this sphere of 
influence lest one of the states in their respective sphere of influence is lost to the enemy. 
The middle powers are in one of the spheres of influence but have no interest in 
contributing to the maintenance of this sphere in which they don’t have an important 
power position. They will therefore prefer to free ride, e.g. benefiting from unilateral 
trade liberalization from the superpower, without reciprocating. The superpower is not 
likely to be able to demand reciprocity, because maintenance of the sphere of influence 
against the enemy requires economic growth and military security for the allied states, 
lest they not fall in hands of the enemy. Moreover peace is not subject to rivalry in a 
bipolar system; middle-sized powers know the superpower will protect them because it is 
                                                 
13 Regarding the maintenance costs of the regime itself it can therefore be expected that great powers will 
contribute disproportionally. But then the question is whether unilateral trade liberalization by great powers 
can be regarded as ‘maintenance’. I would argue that although unilateral trade liberalization may contribute 
to the maintenance of the regime, normal maintenance costs lie in the area of organizational costs of 
negotiations, regime institutions and retaliations. 
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greatly in its interest to do so and hence the superpower is not likely to be able to threaten 
the allies into reciprocal trade liberalization in exchange for military security. A shift 
from a bipolar to a unipolar system has important consequences.14 The interest a 
hegemon has in other states in the system is likely to be smaller than the interest a 
superpower has in the welfare and security of other states, since the common enemy has 
disappeared. As a consequence the hegemon can be expected to pay greater attention to 
the expected distribution of gains from trade liberalization than a superpower and will be 
less indulgent to free riding efforts of middle-sized powers. Moreover, the middle-sized 
power is now confronted with an incredibly powerful state which is not only likely to be 
able, but also to be willing to enforce reciprocity in trade liberalization. Of course, 
middle-sized states would still like to free ride, but since they are likely to expect that the 
hegemon will not easily accept free riding – which makes an outcome of no liberalization 
or coercion into reciprocal liberalization more likely – they can be expected to prefer 
voluntary reciprocal trade liberalization, assuming that they are able to benefit from trade 
liberalization in the first place. 
 
Interaction capacity and the role of institutions 
Another factor which has an impact on national preference formation is the interaction 
capacity of the system. The interaction capacity influences ‘conditions of interactions’ 
(Buzan, Jones and Little 1993, 70) for all states and thereby defines the expected degree, 
intensity and velocity of interactions between states. The interaction capacity of the 
system is determined by the evolution of technology (weapons technology, 
communication, transport and information) and the density of shared norms and 
institutions (Buzan Jones and Little 1993, 69-71; Van der Vleuten 2001, 35. The degree 
to which states interact with each other, influences the way in which they define their 
interests (influencing the weight that is attached to the factors which are included in the 
cost/benefit calculation resulting in a state’s preference ordening). For states that 
frequently interact, the costs of using violence for example increase and states develop a 
pattern of behaviour in which they regard reciprocity and credibility as more important 
                                                 
14 A change in the polarity of the international system itself may already be expected to lead to (a period of) 
uncertainty and instability. States in a rapidly changing environment are likely to be careful because the 
chances of misjudging the situation increase under such circumstances. 
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(cf Axelrod and Keohane 1993, 109). This would not be expected on the basis of the 
anarchic structure of the international system. As such, the interaction capacity of the 
international system filters the effects of the external structure and, consequently affects 
the actual behaviour of units (Van der Vleuten 2001, 36). 
 The fact that institutional density impacts on the degree of interaction between 
states, which in turn influences the way in which states define their interests, implies that 
international institutions have effects on national preference formation. Since 
international organizations are an important aspect of the foreign trade policy area, I will 
analyze how institutions may influence state interests. International institutions can be 
defined as ‘related complexes of rules and norms’ (Keohane 1989, 163). They may for 
example take the form of international organizations or regimes. Once states are member 
of organizations, this membership influences the way in which states define their 
interests. The principles and rules of an organization or regime ‘reduce the range of 
expected behavior of states’ (Keohane 1984, 97) and thereby reduce uncertainty 
(Keohane 1984, 97). The GATT-regime for example only allows protectionist measures 
under certain conditions; such rules – especially when sanctions are foreseen in the case 
of non-compliance – influence the costs and benefits attached to different behavioural 
options. Non-compliance would engender economic costs in the form of sanctions15 and 
ideological costs, because it would negatively affect a state’s credibility (which can be 
expected to be very important in a system with a high interaction capacity). More 
generally, international institutions and regimes provide information, reducing transaction 
costs and ‘increasing the predictability of life for the states taking part in it’ (Lieshout 
1999, 28). As such, they also provide stability, which – as explained earlier – extends the 
time-horizons of states in the process of national preference formation, increasing the 
value states attach to expected long-term gains. 
 Institutions clearly provide states with important benefits. States have invested in 
institutions, which in turn reduced the costs of certain behavioural patterns. A lot of 
information would be lost if these institutions were to collapse and starting new 
organizations or regimes is very costly. The survival of an organization or regime may 
                                                 
15 Of course these costs still have to be weighted against the economic and/or political gains expected from 
non-compliance (in this case protectionism). 
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therefore enter into the notion of a state’s interest. The value a state attaches to the 
institution in question depends on the size of the benefits that the institution has provided 
in the past (Van der Vleuten 2001, 64). This also explains why states may choose to live 
by the rules of certain institutions which have been beneficial in the past, even if 
following the rule would on some occasions not lead to maximum benefits or even 
incidental losses. 
 Finally, coming back to the relative gains problem (fn 6, page 7), it can be 
expected that sensitivity to gaps in relative gains decreases as the interaction capacity 
increases. The interaction capacity filters the structural imperative of self-help to which 
relative gains concerns are related. When states interact heavily in different sectors of the 
international system, relative losses in one agreement may be compensated by relative 
gains in another agreement (both within and across sectors). Furthermore, increasing  
economic interdependence – which can be logically related to an increasing interaction 
capacity – makes states less sensitive to gaps in gains (cf Buzan, Jones and Little 1993, 
43), because even if these economic gains were used to expand military capabilities, 
actual use of these capabilities would not be likely since it would also negatively affect 
the interest of the user.16 Of course, a state’s sensitivity to gaps in gains will also vary 
with the degree to which there are tensions in the international system and with the 
identity of the state it interacts with (whether this is an enemy or an ally). However, these 
are all situational factors which only arise in the process of preference formation, 
whereas interaction capacity is a systemic factor. 
 
4. State capabilities, state structure and the process of preference formation 
 
Just like the external variables expounded in the previous section, internal variables also 
constrain the range of options a state government has and the price tags attached to them, 
thereby influencing national preference formation. I take the government to be the central 
actor in the process of national preference formation in which the government considers 
its own interests in relation to the preferences of societal actors and decides on the 
national preference that will be fought for in the international arena. In this process, the 
                                                 
16 As Waltz indicates, the costs of breaking an interdependent relation are high (1979, 104). 
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government – for the different available behavioural options subjectively available - 
weighs the expected economic, ideological and political costs and benefits. Economic 
costs and benefits include the expected consequences for national income, export-import 
ratio’s etcetera. Ideological costs and benefits may be related to the degree to which 
behavioural options correspond with governmental goals, political colour and policy 
paradigm. Political costs and benefits are related to the degree to which a behavioural 
option corresponds with the wishes of the electorate and societal actors.17 I assume that it 
is the aim of the government to safeguard its internal position: the government wants to 
be reelected. This can clearly be related to the political costs and benefits of behavioural 
options, but also to economic costs and benefits, since societal satisfaction and the 
chances of reelection may be linked to safeguarding or enhancing economic growth 
(Milner 1998, 23; Keohane and Nye 1978, 38-41). Policy changes (e.g. trade 
liberalization through abolishing export subsidies) have distributional and electoral 
consequences (Milner 1997, 16). Therefore, it can be expected that the government will 
take account of societal preferences when deciding on the national preference that will be 
taken in the international arena. 
 Clearly, internal variables influence preference formation. In the remainder of this 
section, I will first focus on the influence of state capabilities. Next, I will turn to the 
internal structure of the state and show that it has important consequences for the degree 
to which a government may follow its own preferences against the will of society without 
suffering high political costs. Finally, I will introduce some important process variables 
which influence national preference formation. 
 
4.1 Material capabilities of the state 
Material capabilities of the state include capabilities as divers as national income, military 
power, demographic characteristics, geographic location, climate and available natural 
resources (Lieshout 1999b, 178). The more capabilities a state has, the less it will be 
influenced by changes in its environment. The more capabilities a state has in relation to 
another state with which it interacts, the less the former needs to take into account the 
wishes of the latter and the more sensible it would be for the latter to take account of the 
                                                 
17 For a dissertation in which a similar assumption is made, see Van der Vleuten, 2001. 
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wishes of the former.18 Great powers are better able to realize national interests with 
unilateral solutions, whereas small states are often in need of multilateral solutions. In the 
trade policy area, a unilateral protectionist strategy is more feasible for a great power with 
a considerable degree of autarky, because such a state will be able to shift the costs of 
protectionism on others. The predominance in capabilities of great powers also enables 
them to impose sanctions on others and to prevail in a potential trade war. Smaller states 
with open economies, in contrast, are so dependent on world markets, that unilateral 
protectionism would be costly, because they are vulnerable to retaliation of great powers 
(Katzenstein 1985, 24). Clearly, material capabilities influence the costs and benefits 
attached to different behavioural trade policy options, e.g. a protectionist option. 
 A specific capability influencing the costs and benefits attached to liberalization, 
and therefore of importance for explaining the actual content of preferences concerning 
trade policy, is the international competitiveness of a state’s national producers. States 
can be expected to prefer liberalization in sectors in which they have a competitive 
advantage.19 In such a case, liberalization would provide new export opportunities and 
hence economic gains. Moreover, the political costs of liberalization are likely to be 
limited, for internationally competitive sectors generally have more exporting producers 
than import-competing producers.20 Hence, liberal policies can be expected to meet more 
societal support and less resistance when national producers are relatively more 
competitive. 
 
4.2 State structure and its consequences 
 
Functional differentiation 
                                                 
18 This corresponds with the remark made in section 3.1 (p.7) based on Grieco (1990, 39) that the more 
resources a state has, the more it will be able to influence others and the more it will be able to resist their 
influence attempts. 
19 It is important to note that in specific interactions (e.g. negotiations), it is all about a state’s relative 
competitiveness compared to the states with whom it interacts. A state will only favour liberalization in 
negotiations with a group of states within which it is relatively competitive. This also explains why regional 
trade liberalization is sometimes preferred to multilateral trade liberalization. 
20 Likewise, Frieden and Rogowski explain the preferences of different domestic groups on the basis of 
their competitiveness and conclude that relatively competitive groups (e.g. exporting groups) will demand 
liberalization, whereas relatively uncompetitive groups (e.g. import-competing groups) will demand 
protectionism (Frieden and Rogowski 1996, 46). 
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States differ in the functions and competences they consider to be theirs. The broader a 
state defines its tasks in relation to the national economic market and towards society, the 
higher the degree of state intervention (Van der Vleuten 2001, 38). State intervention into 
economic sectors may lead to policies which are advantageous to specific societal groups; 
these groups have an interest in maintaining this kind of state intervention in their sector. 
When a government wishes to change its policy, these groups can be expected to 
mobilize against the government, because they have an interest in the status quo 
(Lieshout 1995, 170). All other things being equal, the larger the degree of state 
intervention, the larger the degree of societal mobilization (demands and pressure) may 
be expected when a government wants to change its policy (for a similar argument see 
Nordlinger 1981, 21). For example, the more past policy has sheltered groups from 
international competition, ‘the fiercer is the likely opposition to removing previous 
protection’ (Frieden and Rogowski 1996, 46). Some authors argue that, as a result, 
interventionist states are more susceptible to societal constraints (e.g. Nordlinger 1981, 
21). However, I would argue that state intervention only influences the degree to which 
societal mobilization can be expected: the extent to which this mobilization is likely to 
produce political costs and, in effect, constrain the government in the process of national 
preference formation, depends on the polarity of the state to which I will no turn. 
 
Internal polarity 
In the international system, polarity refers to the distribution of capabilities over states. In 
the national system, (internal) polarity refers to the division of power (structural power 
relations) between government and society21; the higher this polarity, the more these 
power relations are in the advantage of the government. The higher the structural 
capability of the government to impose its will on other domestic actors (or to follow its 
preferences against the will of these domestic actors), the higher the internal polarity 
(Van der Vleuten 2001, 39). I use four factors to estimate the structural power relations 
between state and society (internal polarity): 1. The degree to which state power is 
centralized; 2. The structure of government; 3. Power relations between government and 
parliament; 4. The system of interest representation. I will now discuss each separately. 
                                                 
21 With the term ‘society’, I refer not only to societal groups, but also to the legislative and political parties. 
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A. The degree to which state power is centralized. 
Essentially, this is about the question whether power is centralized at the top, or, in 
contrast, dispersed.22 A high degree of centralization contributes to a high internal 
polarity, whereas decentralization or dispersion of power is associated wit lower internal 
polarity. Decentralization imposes institutional constraints on central state government: 
veto-positions or veto-points in the words of Schmidt (1996, 386). In case of federalism, 
the central government shares power with lower level governments and needs to 
cooperate with this lower level in policy making. Furthermore, the sharing of power or 
competences results in a great dispersal of decision sites and makes states highly 
permeable to domestic groups (Nordlinger 1981, 183). Decentralization provides societal 
groups with many access points (and intermediaries through which they can gain 
influence) and their strategies of influence can be more varied and intricate (Rogowski 
1999, 133). Moreover, the smaller the constituency from which officials are elected, the 
more they are likely to represent particularistic interests (McConnel 1966, 108-109). 
Regional governments can be expected to be more open to the demands of particularistic 
groups and to represent their interests than the central government. Central governments 
(as a whole) and presidents are elected from larger constituencies and are likely to be 
supported by a wider range of different groups (which may be mutually countervailing) 
and are more likely to focus on the general interest than on very particularistic interests. 
We can conclude that, as the degree of centralization decreases, the central government is 
increasingly inhibited to push through its wishes against the will of other institutions and 
groups. 
 
B. The structure of government 
The structure of government provides information on the arena, or ultimate decision unit, 
in which decisions are eventually made. I propose a typology of governmental structure 
on the basis of two characteristics. First, the general division of power within the 
government can be centralized - in the hands of a president or government leader who 
                                                 
22 Factors which may be used to operationalize the degree of centralization are the presence or absence of 
federalism, bicameralism, an independent central bank (Lijphart 1999, 3-4), possibility and use of 
referendums and parliamentary vs. presidential government (Huber, Rogin and Stephen 1993, 728). 
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clearly has ultimate decision making power – or decentralized, when there is no primes 
inter pares within the government who has ultimate decision making power. Again, 
centralization leads to a high internal polarity.23  
 The second characteristic is the degree to which departments are autonomous. In 
the case of departmental autonomy, an individual department can autonomously decide 
on policy within its sectoral/functional domain: other departments may be consulted, but 
the individual department has the power to ultimately decide. When different departments 
have a say in a policy domain and none is authorized to be the sole decision maker, then 
there is no departmental autonomy. Departmental autonomy leads to a lower polarity and 
non departmental autonomy leads to a higher polarity. When one department decides on 
policies in its sectoral domain, then its focus will be narrower than when different 
departments – each with their own focus – decide on a policy. This argument is based on 
two assumptions. First, that the functional division of tasks within the government leads 
to departments with a narrower focus than the government as a whole would have and 
these departments may develop their own internal culture and world views which 
insulates them from their environment even more (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 722-
724). Secondly, departments have an interest in maximizing their staff and budgets, and 
the degree to which this interest can be served partly depends on the well being of the 
sector that the department governs (Messerlin 1983, 18). Departments are therefore likely 
to be open to the particularistic interests in their sector. We can conclude that 
departmental autonomy would be more advantageous to the particularistic interests 
within that sector, whereas the sharing of competences by different departments would 
increase the likelihood of more general interests to be followed.24
 
C. Executive-legislative relations 
                                                 
23 This conclusion is based on the assumption that presidents and government leaders are less easily 
accessible to societal groups and are more focused on the ‘general interest’ than ministers and their 
departments (especially functional ministries) to which societal groups have easier access and who have a 
more narrow focus as a result of functional divisions (Moe 1989, 279-281; McConnell 1966, 164). 
24 In the latter case, the narrow focus of one department is balanced by the different focus of other 
departments. 
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Executive-legislative relations may be characterized either by executive dominance25, or 
by an executive-legislative balance26. The former leads to a lower polarity and the latter 
to a higher polarity. When relations are executive dominated, the government can more 
easily act against the wishes of parliament (as long as it has the support of its own party), 
whereas parliament may be an important veto-power in case of an executive-legislative 
balance. Parliament is then likely to be able to exert influence in the process of national 
preference formation (cf Milner 1997, 19). Moreover, societal groups are likely to try to 
influence government through parliament as an intermediary organization.27 In case of 
executive dominance this parliamentary pathway will be less effective and societal 
groups are more likely to direct their lobbying activities at the government itself. 
 
D Method of interest representation 
A state’s method of interest representation can be placed on a continuum between 
pluralism28 and corporatism. Two factors are of importance when placing a state on this 
continuum: 1. The degree to which interest intermediation is institutionalized: if 
privileged groups have formal access to decision making and have seats in powerful 
committees etc. 2. The number of groups with privileged access within a sector: whether 
or not one group has a representational monopoly. 
 
Figure 2: Continuum between pluralism and corporatism  
Pluralism                       Structured pluralism/ weak corporatism                     Corporatism 
Å---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Æ 
No institutionalization Intermediate institutionalization  High institutionalization 
No rep. monopoly         Intermediate number of groups  Representational monopoly 
 
 
Pluralism may be associated with a higher polarity and corporatism with a lower polarity. 
The power relations between government and groups are more advantageous to groups in 
                                                 
25 Executive dominance is often associated with presidential governments as opposed to parliamentary 
governments (Lijphart 1999, 117). However, I regard executive dominance also to be present when the 
government is a one-party majority government (with a stable marjority in parliament). 
26 Minority governments and coalition governments lead to an executive-legislative balance. 
27 The legislative is more likely to be open to particularistic interests than the government. In the first place, 
because parliament has a representative role and, secondly, because members of parliament (at least in one 
of the two chambers) are often chosen from a smaller constituency. 
28 Here, pluralism thus does not refer to a pluralist theory of domestic politics in which pluralism is attached 
to an influential role for society in decision making. 
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a corporatist network. They are able to influence national preferences through their 
formal access to decision-making processes and they do not have to compete with rival 
groups within their sector. Moreover, corporatism is commonly associated with a culture 
of consensual policy making and compromise (Van Waarden 1992, 47-48). Groups in a 
pluralist network are weak as a result of their lack of formal access and because the 
‘presence of several competing interests could in principle mean that they will prevent 
one another from realizing their interests directly (Van Waarden 1992, 44), which 
provides the state with increased room of manoeuvre (See Nordlinger 1981, 157 and 
Culpepper 1993, 306 for a similar argument).29
In order to determine the internal polarity, the four factors elaborated above, need to be 
combined by adding up the four scores to arrive at one total score. The result indicates the 
structural power relations between state and society: the higher this polarity, the more 
state-dominated these relations are; and the lower the polarity, the more society-
dominated these relations are. 
 
High polarity        Low polarity 
Å-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Æ 
State-dominated          Society-dominated 
 
 
4.3 The process of preference formation 
The internal structure of the state provides information on the structural power relations 
between state and society and therefore about the government’s ability to act contrary to 
societal demands, or about the ability of society to influence government. In case of a 
high internal polarity, society can be expected to need to exert much more pressure in 
                                                 
29 The term corporatism is also used to refer to an organization of society ‘in which groups are organized 
into national, specialized hierarchical and monopolistic peak associations’ (Lijphart 1999, 171). Risse-
Kappen (1991, 492) associates such a corporatist structure or organization of society with societal 
dominance in state-society relations. I would argue that a corporatist (or centralized as I will call it in the 
remainder of this paper) structure of society itself does not give society structural power. This would only 
be the case if the method of interest representation is also corporatist and if the other factors determining 
internal polarity also indicate a relatively low polarity. A centralized structure of society does provide 
society with advantages in the process of preference formation, since peak associations generally have 
many resources in the form of money and members and because it facilitates mobilization. 
Paper Gerry van der Kamp-Alons, Politicologenetmaal Antwerpen 2004                                                  23                     
order to gain influence than if polarity were low.30 The internal structure, however, does 
not determine the behaviour of government or society; in only enables and constrains.31 A 
number of factors arising in the process of preference formation also have important 
effects. 
 
Issue salience, mobilization and politicization 
In order for societal groups to mobilize and exert pressure on the government, the 
political issue in question must be salient to them: the proposed policy must greatly affect 
them, either because it provides huge benefits or because it would induce high costs. In 
the words of Milner: ‘The groups who stand to lose or gain economically from the 
policies are the ones who will become politically involved’ (Milner 1997, 63). 
Mobilization, exerting pressure, is needed in order to gain influence. Even society-
dominated power relations (low polarity) are irrelevant if society does not try to exert 
influence. The more pressure society exerts, the higher the chances of producing political 
costs for the government and influencing the national preference. 
 An issue can also become politicized. With this, I mean that the issue becomes 
salient to even more groups, including groups from outside the issue-area. On the one 
hand, politicization increases mobilization which can produce increased political costs for 
the government. On the other hand, the interference of more groups increases the chances 
that the different groups have different preferences and try to push the government in 
opposite directions. This may eventually increase the government’s room of manoeuvre, 
because it offers the ability to divide and rule. Moreover, decisions on issues which are 
politicized tend to be taken at a high level within the government, and presidents or 
government leaders are likely to become involved, decreasing the chances of one 
particularistic interest getting its way. 
 
Unity 
                                                 
30 Skidmore and Hudson (1993, 7-8) reach a similar conclusion when stating that as a state is strong and 
insulated, then societal opposition can be ignored, ‘at least until it reaches very high levels’. 
31 In line with Putnam’s two-level games, a government that has a weak power position in relation to 
society may choose to fight for another preference in the international arena than the preference that would 
be based on the national economic, political and ideological costs and benefits, if this other preference 
would entail a policy that would strengthen the government’s position in relation to society (see also Van 
der Vleuten 2001, 55-56. 
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Both government and society are aided by a certain degree of internal unity. Lack of 
unity within the government weakens its ability to follow its preferences against the will 
of society, even if the government’s structural power position is strong (high polarity). 
Discord negatively affects a government’s decisiveness, producing difficulty in reaching 
decisions, including decisions which would be against the will of society. Governments 
would need a considerable degree of unity to take such decisions. However, the degree to 
which unity is needed is likely to vary with the governmental structure. In case of 
departmental autonomy, unity within the total government is of less importance because 
it is one department who takes the ultimate decision. A higher degree of governmental 
unity is likely to be needed if there is no departmental autonomy and a number of 
departments have to decide on the policy.  
 The chances for society of gaining influence may also be inhibited by a lack of 
unity. Political mobilization, however large, is less likely to lead to societal influence if 
different societal groups press for opposite policies. Eventually, the whole parallelogram 
of societal preferences must be taken into account to estimate societal influence. Of 
course, some groups are more powerful than others (as a result of material resources and 
privileged access) and it is the position of these powerful groups that matters most 
because they are able to exert considerable pressure; unity between these groups is 
therefore important. Within a particular sector, unity between groups is especially 
important if the method of interest intermediation is pluralist. In contrast, if the method of 
interest representation is corporatist – implying that there is one powerful peak 
association with privileged access – then unity between different groups within the sector 
is less important as long as the (leadership of)32 the peak association is united. However, 
if the sectoral issue becomes politicized and groups from other sectors start to mobilize, 
then unity between the most important mobilized groups in society is of importance 
again. 
 
Sensitivity of the government 
                                                 
32 Some authors argue that the leadership of a peak association is in a strong position in relation to the 
associations which are member of the peak association (Keeler 1987, 11). Therefore, it is not so much the 
entire peak association including the members, who have to be united, but only the leadership. 
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The sensitivity of a government to societal pressure varies. A government is more 
sensitive to pressure from the support groups of the political party(ies) the government 
consists of. Also, sensitivity increases if the government has a weak position in 
parliament and when elections are near (Van der Vleuten 2001, 53). In such situations, 
societal pressure is more likely to effectively produce political costs and thereby to 
constrain the government and influence its decisions. 
 
5. Interaction 
 
Actors and institutions at the international and national level interact, leading to 
transnational pathways (which are pathways used intentionally/deliberately by 
governments, transnational organizations or domestic groups to produce a certain effect) 
and transnational effects (effects which are transnational in nature because they originate 
from one level (e.g. international) and produce effects on another level (e.g. national)). 
We will also see that power relations are important as they influence the degree to which 
transnational pathways are effective. 
 
5.1. Transnational pathways 
The government or societal group(s) from one state may contribute to strengthening (a) 
certain societal actor(s) in another state in order to affect (preferably to tip) the balance of 
societal preferences/pressure in that state and influence the national preference formation. 
They may strengthen the societal actors in the other state by providing material (e.g. 
financial) and/or ideological resources (e.g. status and legitimacy) (Van Esch 2001, 114). 
As a result the supported groups will be willing and able to exert more pressure in order 
to influence the national preference. This transnational strategy is likely to be more 
effective if internal polarity is low and if the government is sensitive, for under those 
circumstances domestic groups, including the one(s) supported, will be better able to 
produce political costs and benefits for their government. However, all this transnational 
strategy does is increase the effectiveness of the pressure of (a) particular group(s): it is 
impossible to predict in advance if this transnational support will actually tip the national 
balance. The balance is most likely to be tipped if the existing balance was a draw 
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between supporters and opponents of a certain policy. Furthermore, supporting already 
powerful groups with formal access to decision-making is likely to be more effective than 
supporting weak groups lacking formal access. 
 Societal groups from one state or transnational groups (of which national groups 
of different states are members) may also try to influence the government of another state 
directly. These groups are generally likely to gain more access and exert more influence 
as the internal polarity of the state in question is lower. In addition, the degree to which 
these groups may be expected to gain access and influence also increases with an 
increasing interaction capacity of the international system, especially with a high 
institutional density (Risse-Kappen 1995, 30-31). As a result the internal structure of the 
state is not decisive in determining access of transnational groups, but is mediated by the 
interaction capacity of the international system. This also explains that for societal groups 
in a country with a high polarity, membership of transnational groups may importantly 
contribute to their indirect influence on their own government. Nevertheless, in order for 
the pressure of these transnational groups to be effective, they also need sufficient 
resources and a certain degree of unity. 
 Finally, the government of one state may also try to influence an other 
government by making promises or threats (carrots and sticks) which, through their effect 
on societal groups in the other state, affect the costs and benefits attached to different 
behavioural options and influence national preference formation.33 Threats (e.g. trade 
sanctions on certain products) and promises (e.g. lowering tariffs for certain products) 
made by one state in the process of international bargaining, produce costs for some 
groups and benefits for other groups in the state at which the threat or promise is directed. 
As a result, groups which were already mobilized and are now affected by the 
threat/promise may change their preference and/or increase their pressure on the 
government; and groups which were not yet mobilized but are now affected will also start 
to mobilize and pressure their government. Through the pressure exerted by the affected 
groups, the state that exerted the threat may indirectly influence the political costs 
attached to different behavioural options in the international negotiations and thereby 
                                                 
33 Notice that the use of threats and promises (just like linkage strategies which will be treated below) 
usually are made in the international bargaining process and may therefore lead to a change in national 
preferences, assuming that these initial preferences were formed before negotiations started. 
Paper Gerry van der Kamp-Alons, Politicologenetmaal Antwerpen 2004                                                  27                     
influence the preference formation in the threatened state. Three remarks need to be 
made. First, the degree to which the state exerting the treat/promise is able to produce 
costs or benefits for the threatened state, is related to the mutual dependence between the 
two states and to the credibility and capabilities of the threatening state. In order for a 
threat/promise to produce costs/benefits, there must be an asymmetry in dependence34 
between the two states in the advantage of the threatening state. Moreover, the 
threatening state must be credible in the eyes of the threatened state (known to execute its 
threats and keep its promises) and must have sufficient capabilities. Secondly, the degree 
to which this strategy is able to effectively influence the political costs and benefits of the 
threatened state depends on the internal polarity of that state and the sensitivity of the 
government. Thirdly, it is impossible to predict if the strategy will eventually have the 
intended effect, since the effect on the ‘balance of societal preferences/pressure’ is 
insecure. The chances of the strategy having the intended effect increase as the strategy 
actually affects the intended groups, which as a result change their preferences or start 
mobilizing for the first time, and if these groups are resourceful (material resources and 
institutional access).  
 
Transnational effects 
 
The arena at the European level in which decisions on the mandate of the Commission 
are made may influence the national arena in which national preferences are formed. The 
General Affairs Council is the formal arena in which decisions on the total mandate for 
the Commissions are made. However, the Council of Ministers in other compositions, 
e.g. the Agricultural Council, often also formulate opinions on those parts of the mandate 
which are of interest to them, and the General Affairs Council is not likely just to 
overrule these opinions. Since different national ministries are involved in the decision 
making in different Councils of Ministers at the European level, the choice of arena at the 
European level may influence the national arena and actors involved in the national 
preference formation. These consequences are most substantial if the governmental 
                                                 
34 If state A is more dependent on state B than state B is dependent on state A (asymmetry in dependence), 
then B is better able to, through its behaviour, produce costs and benefits for state A than state A is able to, 
through its behaviour, produce costs and benefits for state B. 
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structure is decentralized, the degree of departmental autonomy is large and if national 
coordination of EU policy is lacking.35 When this is the case, one state could even end up 
proclaiming different preferences in Councils of Ministers of various compositions.36 In 
states with well functioning mechanisms of national coordination of EU policy, the 
effects of the choice of arena at the European level on the arena of national preference 
formation are likely to be negligible. 
 Another possible transnational effect on national preference formation is the 
effect of linkage. During international negotiations different issues may become linked 
and the solution of one issue is attached to the solution of another issue in a package deal. 
Linkage may arise as a common practice within an international institution or as a 
strategy of states involved in the negotiations. Irrespective of its origin, linkage affects 
the calculation of costs and benefits and may therefore lead to a change in national 
preferences. As a result of linkage, a state’s utility function with respect to one issue 
becomes attached to its utility function with respect to another issue. Slight costs with 
respect to one issue may now be balanced by benefits with respect to another issue and 
this enables package deals. However, linkage is not equally likely in all situations, 
because it affects various national groups differently and is likely to engender societal 
pressure. All other things being equal, linkage between issues within the same sector is 
easier to achieve than linkage between issues from different sectors. In case of the 
former, costs and benefits are divided within one sector and therefore more likely to be 
nationally acceptable, whereas in case of linkage betweens sectors, the sector confronted 
with the costs is likely to mobilize and exert substantial pressure on the government not 
to make such a deal. A government’s room to manoeuvre and make package deals against 
the wishes of society increases with the internal polarity of the state (Van der Vleuten 
2001, 57). Governments in states with a high internal polarity are therefore more likely to 
value the benefits of a package deal higher, because the political costs attached to the deal 
are generally lower than in states with a low internal polarity. 
                                                 
35 On the national coordination of EU policy in different member states see: Kassim, H. (2001), The 
national coordination of EU policy: The domestic level, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
36 An official I interviewed made the interesting observation that in Council meetings, especially ministers 
from such states (lacking central coordination) are contacted and pressured by delegations from other 
states, because convincing or influencing these ministers (who seem to have ultimate decision making 
power in their domain) is likely to be most effective. 
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This section is not yet complete. I want to try to explicitly  link the (combination of) 
specific characteristics of the external structure and the internal structure (and thereby 
the power relations between states, within the government and between state and society) 
to the relative impact of the external and internal environments on state preferences.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Explaining national preference formation in member states on the negotiating mandate 
for the Commission regarding trade liberalization requires a theoretical framework for a 
comprehensive explanation of state preferences, providing insights in the conditions 
influencing the relative impact of the internal and external environment and the 
interactions between the internal and external environment. Both international system 
characteristics and state structures constrain and enable, making some behavioural 
options more likely than others by attaching different costs and benefits to the various 
alternatives.  
The anarchic structure of the international system results in a self-help imperative 
for states, motivating them to optimize their resources.  International polarity impacts on 
preference formation by the degree of stability it provides, resulting in more or less 
discounting of the future in the process of preference formation. Also attached to the 
international polarity is the specific position of a state within the system; being a 
hegemon, superpower, middle-sized state in a bipolar system or middle-sized state in a 
unipolar system produces different incentives which impact on preference formation. The 
interaction capacity of the international system filters the effects of these structures 
(anarchy and polarity), and specifically membership of international institutions 
influences the value attached to the different variables in the utility function of states and 
is also likely to extend the time-horizons of states. 
At the level of the state, the specific capabilities a state possesses, influences the 
alternatives a state has at its disposal (e.g. if the state is capable of unilateral actions 
without compromising its power position) and the degree to which this state has to reckon 
with other states.  The internal structure, specifically the internal polarity, indicates the 
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structural power relations between state and society, and thereby the degree to which the 
state is insulated from societal pressure and able to act against the wishes of society. 
These structures, again, constrain and enable. Situational characteristics, only arising in 
the process of preference formation (unity, sensitivity of government) also influence the 
degree to which society is able to produce political costs and benefits for the government 
in particular situations. 
The interactions between the external and internal environment give rise to 
transnational pathways and transnational effects. Power relations at different levels (e.g. 
internal polarity and the power balance within society) intervene between these 
transnational pathways and the degree to which they are likely to be effective. Exploring 
the consequences of different combinations of specific characteristics of the external 
structure and the internal structure (that is; of different combinations of power relations) 
for the relative impact of the internal and external environment on state preferences is a 
subject which still needs further elaboration. 
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